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South American Regional Integration: Two Moments in Mercosur’s 
Integration Trajectory 
 
Steen Fryba Christensen1 
 
The focus of the analysis here is on two distinct periods in Mercosur’s 
integration trajectory, namely 1991-2002 and 2003-2007. The reason for this is 
that Mercosur has changed its course between the first and the second of these 
phases. After a period of “open regionalism” and liberalizing reforms, a shift in 
Mercosur’s integration model has occurred in recent years. The year 2003 is 
taken as the historical moment where this change took hold due to the 
convergence in thinking in Argentina and Brazil, the two countries that together 
form the central axis of Mercosur. 
 
Mercosur was formed in 1991 with the four original members Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. In 1995 the block created a customs union. Chile and 
Bolivia became associated members in 1996, and in 2006 Venezuela became the 
fifth full member of Mercosur. Thus, Mercosur has deepened and expanded 
through its historical trajectory. Today it forms the backbone of South American 
regional integration that has developed further with the introduction of South 
American presidential summits in 2000 (Lafer, 2004)  and the creation of the 
Community of South American Nations in 2004 (Mercadante, 2006). Both of 
these developments happened on the initiative of Brazil.  
 
Brazil has thus had a leading role in the construction of South American 
regional integration. With an economy that corresponds to more than 50 % of 
South American GDP (Guimarães, 2006: 273) Brazil is bound to maintain this 
leading role in the process of South American regional integration.   
 
The analysis focuses on the integration trajectory of Mercosur in the light of 
South American regional integration. It is thus not the aim to analyze the 
Mercosur in the light of Latin American integration or integration at the level of 
the whole Western Hemisphere. The reason for this is that the Western 
Hemisphere seems to be splitting up into two parts with Central America and 
Mexico centred on North America and South America pursuing more diversified 
strategies. Along with the focus on South American regional integration, the 
relationship between USA and Mercosur is brought into the analysis as a central 
issue. In the early part of the 1990s it was generally believed that a free trade 
block of the Americas centred on the US economy would develop. The most 
likely scenario was a world economy divided into three major economic blocks 
centred on the US, the EU and Japan. However, the FTAA has never taken hold. 
 
                                                          
1 Assistant Professor at Aalborg University. sfc@hum.aau.dk.  
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Main objectives 
Latin America embarked on a route of liberalizing reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s leaving behind a history of state-led development pursued through 
import-substitution and industrialization (ISI) strategies that had been pursued 
from the 1930s to the 1980s. However, the liberal reforms have had 
disappointing results and have led to a redirection in development strategies, 
particularly in South America, in recent years. The analysis aims at explaining 
the redirection in development strategies in South America, particularly with 
regard to how this is affecting the integration process in Mercosur and South 
America as well as with regard to how this affects the relationship between 
Mercosur and the United States.  
 
 
Methodological and Theoretical Key Issues2 
The analysis combines a historical approach to integration with an emphasis on 
world historical situations seen in their totality. Country specific factors, with an 
emphasis on Argentina and Brazil, are considered at the same time, since 
integration between different countries cannot be understood without 
understanding domestic factors. With this approach I seek to explain the 
emergence and evolution of Mercosur.  
 
The analysis sets out with a historical treatment of integration in order to 
achieve two goals, firstly to find significant patterns in historical processes of 
regional integration in Latin America that may shed light on the two phases in 
Mercosur’s recent integration trajectory, and, secondly, in order to account for 
the historical and contextual factors that led to the emergence of Mercosur in the 
early 1990s and to account for the factors that led Mercosur on a different path 
in the second of the two phases of the analysis. 
 
 
Outline of the Analysis 
The analysis developed below focuses on four periods. The first section focuses 
on the period from the “discovery” of the Americas to 1985 when Argentina and 
Brazil started to seek to develop a strategic partnership. The experience of “old 
regionalism” in LAFTA and ALADI are discussed. The second section focuses 
on the period from 1986 to 1990. The third section focuses on the period from 
1991 when Mercosur was created and implemented a more open “new 
regionalism” than the more closed model pursued in earlier regionalist schemes. 
The typologies of old and new regionalism are useful in the discussion of the 
different phases of Mercosur’s integration. The fourth section analyzes 
Mercosur’s trajectory from 2003 to 2007 seeking to compare and contrast this 
                                                          
2 The scope of the present work does not allow a systematic in depth discussion of theory and method. Only the 
most central elements are discussed. 
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phase with the 1991-2002 phase and to discuss why such a change occurred and 
where Mercosur and South American integration may be going. 
 
The analysis focuses particularly on Brazil and Argentina and to a lesser extent 
on Uruguay and Paraguay as well as other South American and Latin American 
countries. With regard to the fourth section, the issue of Mercosur’s possible 
expansion and deepening is discussed as well as the relationship between 
Mercosur and the United States. 
 
 
1. The Historical Background prior to 1986    
Latin American regional integration did not play much of a role until 1960. 
There was little mutual trade due to the similar specialization in raw materials of 
the economies, a typical characteristic of formerly colonized countries that some 
analysts refer to as the “colonial syndrome”. Protectionist policies aimed at 
promoting national industrialization also worked against regional integration. 
However, some trade did take place within the region, particularly between 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Mutual trade between these countries 
increased in importance during the Second Word War and in the first years after 
the war reaching a record high of 12.2% of their total trade in 1953 when a 
decline in mutual trade occurred, largely due to balance of payments difficulties 
experienced by the countries (Furtado, 1972: 197).  
 
In response to this decline and inspired by ECLA’s (Economic Commission for 
Latin America) ideas regarding the need for broader markets to sustain a more 
diversified industrialization process, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay established LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade 
Agreement) in 1960 (ibid). Later, Colombia and Ecuador and then Bolivia and 
Venezuela joined LAFTA (Rapoport and Musacchio, 1993: 60). With the 
diversity of the members LAFTA can be considered an asymmetric integration 
scheme. According to ECLA thinking the agreement sought to avoid unbalanced 
outcomes by giving special treatment to the less advanced economies. The 
ultimate aim was to establish a zone of free trade by 1973 (ibid). Along with free 
trade inside the region, the Montevideo Treaty included provisions for “sectoral 
or ‘complementarity’ agreements, designed to promote co-ordination at the 
production level. The idea was to facilitate industrial integration by enabling 
producers to divide complementary activities among themselves and so to gain 
access to a larger market” (Furtado, 1972: 200 [1970]). LAFTA represents the 
“classic” type of “old regionalism” characterized by high protectionist walls 
towards third countries outside the region and by a state-led approach to 
industrialization.   
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It proved difficult to turn the aims into reality. Trade levels recovered initially 
(ibid: 200-201) but fell back again from 1965 as countries experienced balance 
of payments difficulties. Negotiations aimed at establishing a free trade zone ran 
into difficulties in the industrial area where there was strong resistance at the 
national level (Mallmann, 1994: 22). Dissatisfaction with regional integration 
was particularly strong in the lesser developed Andes countries that decided to 
establish a sub-regional group in 1969 (Rapoport and Musacchio, 1993: 61-62). 
In other words, LAFTA was unsuccessful in dealing with the problems posed by 
initial economic asymmetries and balance of payments problems created 
difficulties in the negotiation process. This created nationalist and protectionist 
sentiments in the less developed countries.  
 
During the period up to 1980, Latin American countries experienced quite 
diverse development outcomes. Brazil stands out as the most successful with the 
world’s third highest average economic growth rate between 1900 and 1980 
(Abreu, 2002: 15), whereas Argentina experienced a process of de-
industrialization in the late 1970’s as a consequence of its response to the oil 
crisis. This made Argentina fall behind Brazil in terms of industrialization, a 
trend that has continued during the 1990s (Ferrer, 2006).  
   
As a response to the lack of success of LAFTA, a new and less formal 
integration scheme, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), was 
signed in 1980. Its goal was the establishment of a Latin American common 
market, but it was not established how this should be done nor a timeframe for 
reaching it (Rapoport and Musacchio, 1993: 62-63). 
 
 
2. The Argentina-Brazil Integration Act (1986-1990) 
After a long history of rivalry between Argentina and Brazil (Guimarães, 2006: 
273) and tensions until 1979 over the escalation of nuclear programs pursued by 
both countries (Ferrer, 2006; Escudé, 1995: 11), the two countries undertook an 
initiative of bilateral integration in the mid-80’s. The settlement of the conflict 
over the Itaipú hydro-electrical project (Ferrer, 1998: 61)3, distension on the 
nuclear front (ibid) and the introduction of democracy in Argentina in 1983 and 
in Brazil in 1985 created a favourable context for closer cooperation.  
 
At a presidential meeting in 1985, Brazil’s new president José Sarney and 
Argentina’s president Raúl Alfonsín made the political decision to pursue 
increased bilateral integration between their two countries. This decision was 
followed up by the signing of an integration act, within the LAIA framework, 
and the establishment of a programme for the integration and cooperation of 
Argentina and Brazil. The aim was to gradually establish a common market 
                                                          
3 Itaipú had negative impacts on the waterways downstream in Argentina. 
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(Ferrer, 1998: 56). The programme consisted of 24 protocols with sector specific 
projects, particularly in different industrial sub-sectors and in the energy sector. 
The idea was to promote common projects and intra-industrial integration 
(Lavagna, 1998: 171-179) and to assure balanced trade between the two 
countries, both in terms of the quantity and the quality of trade (Jardel and 
Barraza, 1998: 37-38). The integration process was thus characterized by a state-
led approach to development. Protectionist policies towards third countries were 
maintained, no major effort at privatizations was made and integration was 
planned and managed by the states. Thus, this initial phase of integration 
between Argentina and Brazil is an example of “old integration”. 
 
At the outset of this phase of integration, both Argentina and Brazil faced 
serious external economic constraints from their foreign debts, but pursued 
similar stabilization programs that helped reignite economic growth and led to a 
rise in mutual trade led by industrial exports (Lavagna, 1998: 255-256 and 281). 
However, the two countries ran into serious balance of payments problems due 
to a combination of external economic and political factors. 
 
Regarding the economic side of the problems, the trade surplus fell in both 
countries in response to the stabilization programmes that strengthened the 
national currencies (Fanelli and Frenkel, 1993: 388; Dias Carneiro, 1988: 158) 
and increased the dependency on capital inflows to finance current account 
deficits provoked by the financing costs of the foreign debts that had virtually 
exploded between 1979 and 1982 in the context of international financial 
instability.  
 
With regard to political causes of economic instability and stagnation, in the 
case of Argentina the Peronist opposition blocked the privatizations defended by 
the government and the IMF as a way to stabilize the economy (Torre, 1998: 
46). In the case of Brazil, the government introduced a moratorium on interest 
payments to foreign private creditor banks in 1987 thereby defying the position 
taken to the foreign debt problem amongst the foreign creditors. According to 
Brazil’s finance minister at the time, the Brazilian view was that “the sharing of 
the burdens between Brazil and its foreign creditors did not seem fair” (Bresser 
Pereira, 1994: 345).  
 
Thus, a rising dependency on foreign capital inflows to finance rising current 
account deficits combined with a perception amongst foreign creditors and the 
IMF that Argentina and Brazil were unwilling to honour their financial 
obligations led to a balance of payments crisis in both countries and provoked an 
economic downturn. The economic problems contributed to a rethinking of 
development strategies and a rethinking of the regional integration project in the 
following period. 
 6
Mercosur’s first Moment: Regional Integration from 1991 to 2002 
The rethinking of development strategies in Argentina and Brazil can be 
characterized as an attempt to gain external confidence in order to create 
conditions for renewed economic growth. Therefore policies along the lines 
supported by powerful external actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
financial investors and multinational companies were adopted. Carlos Escudé 
has developed an influential theoretical position supporting such a strategy that 
describes the interpretation of the Argentine situation dominant in the Argentine 
government at the time well. According to his theory of weak peripheral states, 
the theory of “peripheral realism”, it is dangerous for weak states to pursue 
confrontational policies towards the leading states, particularly the United 
States, because this can hamper the access to foreign credit and thereby get in 
the way of economic growth (Escudé, 1995: 19). 
 
The rethinking of development strategies had as one of its effects a redirection 
in the regional integration process. In the midst of the economic crisis 
experienced by both Argentina and Brazil, the two new presidents, Brazil’s 
Fernando Collor de Mello and Argentina’s Raúl Carlos Menem, met in July 
1990 and signed the “Acta de Buenos Aires”. The new agreement sped up the 
integration process and changed the methodology of integration. The aim was to 
create a common market within a period of four years using generalized, linear 
and automatic tariff reductions that would end up with zero tariffs by the end of 
the transition period while allowing a longer transition period for sensitive 
industrial sectors (Rapoport and Musacchio, 1993: 65). The common active 
technological and sector policies were left behind as a more market-led 
approach was adopted (Ferrer, 1998: 121). In this way, “new regionalism” was 
introduced. 
 
The regional integration scheme was extended with Uruguay and Paraguay with 
the Treaty of Asunción in March 1991 that created Mercosur. The two new 
member states were allowed one more year for the transition to a common 
market than Argentina and Brazil (Rapoport and Musacchio, 1993: 65-66).  
 
Liberalization internally in Mercosur was coupled with unilateral liberalization 
extra-regionally. This combination of regional liberalization and a more 
generalized opening followed the liberalizing trend in all of Latin America in the 
early 1990s (Abreu, 2002: 7). The new “open regionalism” approach was part of 
a major shift in the strategy of development and international insertion. The 
tendency was to reduce import barriers, sell of state companies and leave behind 
active state policies aimed at picking the winners in the industrial sector.  
 
The liberalization strategy followed the recommendations from the international 
financial institutions and the United States and finds its most highly profiled 
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expression in John Williamson’s “Washington Consensus”, a ten point list of 
recommendations to Latin America suggesting what the region should do to 
restart economic growth in the opinion of “Washington” (Williamson, 1990).  
 
Why did Argentina and Brazil, much like most other Latin American countries, 
introduce this shift in development strategy and what was the aim? 
 
The central aim was to promote economic development just as in the case of the 
former more state-led strategies. However, the traditional strategy used to assure 
economic development was no longer believed to be appropriate in the 
conditions of the early 1990’s (Cervo, 2002: 7). According to a liberal analyst, 
the shift towards a more liberal strategy reflected “the recognition that import 
substitution had failed to provide the incentives for high growth even in the 
economies where the strategy had been more successful in the past” (Abreu, 
2002: 17). The new liberal strategy was introduced by Argentina and Brazil in 
their search for a more competitive insertion in the global economy (Rapoport 
and Musacchio, 1993: 69), reflecting the notion that international 
competitiveness was essential to renewed economic growth and that 
competitiveness was best assured by a liberal market-led development strategy. 
  
This notion built on a particular interpretation of the globalization process and 
its significance for Argentina and Brazil in the context around 1990. There are 
some differences in how Argentina and Brazil interpreted their situation at the 
time and how they believed they should go about improving their situation. 
However, the similarities are quite striking. Both in Argentina and Brazil, the 
context of globalization and external financial vulnerability with its negative 
impact on economic development induced them to introduce strategies of 
development and international insertion along the lines of the Washington 
Consensus. According to Amado Luiz Cervo (2002: 25) Argentina was 
particularly uncritical in its adoption of neo-liberal reforms whereas Brazil was 
somewhat more critical. In the case of both countries, however, the shift was 
built on the interpretation that national states in the periphery had lost the 
capacity to control their own national development due to the context of 
globalization that had transferred power to the centres of power made up by a 
combination of the leading states, financial markets and large corporations (see 
Ferrer, 2006: 5). There was no other option than seeking to adapt to this new 
context through a strategy of openness and integration in the global economy.  
 
In the case of Argentina, the interpretation of Argentina’s situation and of the 
international context in which it had to pursue its development led to the 
adoption of a position in external policy inspired by Carlos Escudé’s doctrine of 
“peripheral realism”. In the case of Brazil, the elites showed overall conformity 
with the neo-liberal agenda pursued by the United States (Herz, 2003), but a less 
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radical approach to the neo-liberal agenda was adopted reflecting some 
differences in thinking. Most significantly, there was a broadly shared 
scepticism of the US vision for the integration of the Western hemisphere in 
Brazil. It was believed that Pan-American integration along the lines promoted 
by the United States could harm Brazilian industrial interests and development 
possibilities due to the asymmetries in development between the two countries. 
Most other countries in Latin America reacted favourably to the US idea of a 
free trade area. According to José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (1998: 3) 
“Brazil is the only country in Latin-America that resisted more or less openly to 
every U.S. initiative in Latin-America since the launching of the Nafta talks and 
the announcement of Bush’s proposal of a free trade area in the Americas.” 
George Bush (1989-1992) launched this idea in 1990 when NAFTA talks took 
their start and the interest of Latin American countries in the idea may be 
explained by a relatively high dependence on the US market for their exports, as 
in the case of Mexico, Central America, Peru and Colombia or by the desire to 
have preferential access to US markets. The enormous size of the US consumer 
market is thus a source of attraction and of US negotiating power with its Latin 
American neighbours. 
 
According to Raúl Bernal-Meza (1999: 163), Brazil was more compromised 
with Mercosur than Argentina, as Brazil saw Mercosur as an instrument in its 
dispute with the United States and as a way to gain leadership in the region. In 
this context, Mercosur was seen as a tool to balance the EU and the US in a 
strategy of international insertion focused on the US and the EU (Cervo, 2003). 
Brazil’s industrial leadership in the region can be seen as a structural element 
that helps explain Brazil’s larger emphasis on integration in Mercosur as 
regional integration could provide an extended home market for Brazilian 
industry and a platform from which to increase international competitiveness. 
Mercosur could function in the same way for Argentina. However, Argentina 
was less compromised with Mercosur and was very interested in the US 
proposal for a hemispheric integration scheme (Bernal-Meza, 1999).  
 
Apart from Brazil’s criticisms of the US agenda for hemispheric integration 
three other differences in policy were discernible in Argentina and Brazil at the 
outset of Mercosur. Firstly, Argentina proceeded particularly fast with 
liberalizing imports. Average import tariffs were thus reduced from 26.5% in 
late 1989 to 9.7% in early 1991. Secondly, Argentina’s privatization process 
proceeded faster than Brazil’s. Argentina basically sold off all state companies 
between 1990 and the end of 1994 (Frenkel and González, 2002), while Brazil 
privatized little in this period (Lacerda, 2000). Lastly, Argentina’s fixed 
exchange rate policy differed from the stabilization strategies chosen in the other 
Mercosur countries. For instance, Brazil pursued a flexible exchange rate policy 
(Baumann and Mussi, 2006: 8). The combination of Argentina’s fixed exchange 
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rate and Brazil’s flexible exchange rate policy led to Argentine deficits in 
bilateral trade until 1994 (Gerchunoff and Llach, 1998) and made it difficult to 
coordinate policies. However, Argentina’s strategy was vastly more successful 
than Brazil’s in terms of economic growth results. Argentina experienced yearly 
economic growth of between 6.0% and 8.9% between 1991 and 1994 (ibid), 
whereas Brazil’s economic growth varied between -0.8% and 6.0% (BCB, 1997: 
11).  
 
The fact that Argentina had been vastly more successful in terms of economic 
growth with its more radical liberal strategy than Brazil had been with its more 
gradualist approach doubtlessly played an important role in Brazil’s decision to 
implement the Real Plan that revolved around the strengthening of the Brazilian 
real in an effort to stabilize inflation. According to Amado Luiz Cervo (2002), 
Cardoso’s4 idea was to privatize, reduce foreign debt, create international 
competitiveness and stabilize inflation with the help of a strengthened currency. 
This was basically the same logic that had led Argentina to introduce its fixed 
exchange rate policy in 1991.  
 
According to Bresser Pereira (1996) the combination of liberalizing reforms and 
socially oriented policies defended by the PSDB that both he and Cardoso 
belonged to corresponded to a modern social democratic policy in opposition to 
the old-fashioned and outdated approach that had emphasized state ownership 
and state intervention in the economy. Clearly, the idea was that liberalizing 
reforms were needed to assure renewed economic growth and social progress in 
the context of Brazil in the 1990s. A policy of adaptation to the neo-liberal 
agenda was therefore seen as progressive due to the assumed benefits it would 
provide in terms of economic growth and a broader tax-base from which to 
support socially oriented policies. The key to this development then was to 
implement a reform of the state and its involvement in the economy by selling 
off state companies and cutting back on the state subsidies that had characterized 
the ISI strategy. 
 
Thus, national development strategies in Argentina and Brazil converged on a 
neo-liberal agenda with similar policies, particularly with the adoption of the 
Real Plan in Brazil in 1994. This had an impact on the character of the type of 
regional integration pursued. Old regionalism with its state-led and protectionist 
policies was left behind and new regionalism with its market-led and liberal 
policies along with privatizations took over.  
 
                                                          
4 Fernando Henrique Cardoso was Brazil’s foreign minister until 1993 when he accepted the difficult position as 
finance minister. In this position he introduced the idea of the Real Plan that was popular with the electorate and 
brought him to electoral victory in presidential elections in 1994. After this, Cardoso was Brazil’s president in 
two periods, namely 1995-1998 and 1999-2002. 
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It can be argued that it was believed that a strategy of passive adaptation to the 
policies preferred by the most powerful external actors provided the best 
possibilities of assuring development success for Argentina and Brazil that 
found themselves in a situation of weakness and lack of power resources. The 
logic of this view was that a cooperative strategy was likely to create external 
confidence. This would make it possible to get the foreign debt problem under 
control and to attract foreign investments which were an essential component in 
the development strategy. However, policy makers did not necessarily see the 
liberal strategy as a sign of passive adaptation and lack of national autonomy. 
Celso Lafer, for instance, has argued (2004) that the liberal approach aimed at 
assuring autonomy through integration in the world economy. Regional 
integration in combination with liberalism was thus seen as a conscious active 
strategy believed to be more suitable to the new context of globalization and 
national external vulnerability. 
 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the creation of Mercosur itself 
represents an active policy that sought to attack the traditional “colonial 
syndrome” of low interdependence between Latin American countries by 
creating a more open preferential trade environment amongst the regional 
partners and thus promote intra-regional trade and at the same time avoid the 
trade-diversion that a more protectionist policy approach towards third countries 
would have provoked. It was hoped that open integration would ensure a more 
competitive insertion in the world economy and thus strengthen industrial 
exports from the region that had been extremely weak under the protectionist 
“old regionalist” policies. Apart from the traditional goal of providing broader 
markets for producers in the regional grouping, Mercosur’s regional integration 
was also a tool in the attraction of foreign direct investments and a way to 
combine forces to gain a stronger voice in the international arena. 
 
In the first four years of its existence, Mercosur produced noteworthy results 
with regard to intra-regional trade. By 1994, intra-regional trade had increased 
from the 1990 level of 4,127 billion US$ to US$ 12,049 billion. This brought the 
weight of intra-regional exports up to 19.5% of total exports from 8.9% 
(ECLAC, 2005: 83). Particularly Argentina and Uruguay came to depend on 
intra-regional exports to a significant degree. In 1995, 32.1% of Argentina’s 
total exports and 46.2% of Uruguay’s total exports went to Mercosur (ECLAC, 
2003: 76). The bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil was characterized 
by a growing importance of advanced industrial exports, particularly from 
Brazil. Industrial exports from Argentina to Brazil also increased, but not to the 
same extent. Also, Argentina’s industrial exports tended to be less 
technologically advanced than Brazil’s (Lavagna, 1998: 255-256) reflecting 
Brazil’s leadership position in the industrial sector inside the region. As a result 
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of the growing intra-regional trade and the renewed economic dynamism, the 
open “new regionalism” approach was generally seen as a big success. 
 
 
The Treaty of Ouro Preto and Mercosur as a Customs Union 
On the background of its success, Mercosur developed into a customs union in 
1995 after the signing of the Treaty of Ouro Preto in December of 1994. With 
the introduction of the customs union, the countries introduced a common 
external tariff for 85% of all products with a medium tariff of 14% and a 
maximum tariff of 20%. With regard to the remaining 15 % of products, each 
country was entitled to fix its own external tariffs between a minimum of 0% 
and a maximum of 35%. However, external tariffs in this segment, which 
included some of the most advanced industrial sectors, were to converge lineally 
and automatically with a common tariff after a transition period of 5 to 10 years 
depending on the sector in question (Lavagna, 1998: 317-318). The treaty 
established differential treatment for the smaller economies, i.e. Paraguay and 
Uruguay, that were allowed a longer transition period and more exceptions at 
the level of the regional common market (CEPAL, 2002: 20).  
 
The aim was to create a “perfect” customs union and a complete common 
market without exceptions. In other words, the approach was rules-oriented with 
an emphasis on fixed norms that corresponded to an ideal type of integration. 
The underlying assumption was that all of the countries should be able to thrive 
in such a scheme regardless of the asymmetries in existence at the outset of the 
transition period that would lead to a perfect customs union and a complete 
common market. This idea reflects the liberal conception underlying the choice 
of integration scheme. From a position emphasizing the danger that economic 
asymmetries could create asymmetrical outcomes and provoke disenchantment 
with integration, the strategy seems unsuitable to the circumstances of the 
smaller economies in the region. According to Lamas (2006) there always 
existed some criticisms of Mercosur inside Paraguay that the regional scheme 
would create competition problems but the worry of standing outside the region 
was even greater. 
 
In Argentina there were different views of how Mercosur should develop. The 
economic minister, Domingo Cavallo, favoured Mercosur as a free trade zone in 
order to allow Argentina more freedom of action in international negotiations 
(Lavagna, 1998: 321). However, according to Lavagna, the fact that no trade 
agreement was reached with NAFTA and the United States paved the way for 
congressional approval of the introduction of the customs union. 
 
The development policies of Argentina and Brazil tended to converge more 
from 1994/95 with Brazil’s introduction of the Real Plan and intra-regional trade 
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continued its expansion in relative and absolute terms. In spite of these factors, 
that ought to have been conducive to ever deeper integration, the development 
strategies of the two countries came to produce serious development problems 
and these problems led to a crisis of the regional integration project around the 
turn of the century.  
 
The key problem was that growing trade and current account deficits increased 
the dependence on capital inflows. In Brazil, the combination of liberal imports 
and a strong currency led to a virtual import boom in 1995. Imports rose from 
around US$ 33 billion in 1994 to around US$ 50 billion in 1995 (IMF, 1998). 
While intra-regional exports rose significantly in Mercosur, extra-regional 
export results were less positive. Therefore, the import boom provoked trade 
deficits and substantial current account deficits. In Brazil’s case, the country ran 
trade deficits with all world regions in the period between 1995 and 1998 after 
the introduction of the Real Plan. This development led to a boom in current 
account deficits that reached more than US$ 34 billion in 1998 (BCB, 1999: 
120) compared to a situation in 1993 where there was practically current account 
balance (IMF, 1998: 7). Argentina faced a similar situation, and the foreign 
debts of the two countries escalated fast. In order to deal with the deficit, Brazil 
pursued a policy of massive privatizations (Lacerda, 2000).  
 
The “competitive insertion” pursued by the two governments thus surely created 
a much more competitive environment for their import-competing businesses 
but it was not particularly successful in helping to assure the competitiveness of 
the industrial sector. As a consequence the relative weight of the industrial 
sector in national GDP fell. In Brazil’s case this happened particularly in the 
1995-1998 period (Vieira, 2006: 19). However, the fall in the relative weight of 
manufacturing industry was more pronounced in the other Mercosur countries in 
the period between 1990 and 2005 than in the case of Brazil. Particularly 
Argentina was hard hit (Baumann and Mussi, 2006: 12) and in 2003 Brazil’s 
industrial output was almost four times as big as Argentina’s (ECLAC, 2004: 
200). 
 
The rise in current account deficits provoked a new fast rise in foreign 
indebtedness both in Argentina and Brazil in spite of the income from 
privatizations. The growing foreign debt and sluggish export growth led to a 
growing dependency on financial inflows and thus a higher level of external 
vulnerability. This growth pattern provoked a new financial crisis in Brazil as 
well as development difficulties in all of the Mercosur member countries in the 
period between 1998 and 2002 and led to tensions in the regional group. 
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Brazil’s Devaluation, Mercosur’s Crisis and Argentina’s default 
The period from 1999 when Brazil devalued its currency in January to 2002 can 
be seen as a transition period for Mercosur’s trajectory. In this period the 
regional integration project is faced with the challenge posed by economic crisis.  
 
Intra-regional exports were hurt by the crisis off-set by Brazil’s devaluation. In 
1999, Argentina’s exports to Brazil fell from US$ 8.034 billion to US$ 5.812 
billion (Bernal-Meza, 2002: 87), something that was quite serious for Argentina 
that had developed an important degree of dependence on the Brazilian market. 
Total intra-regional exports fell from US$ 20.322 billion in 1998 to US$ 15.162 
billion in 1999 (ECLAC, 2005: 83).  
 
This led to tensions in Mercosur, but also to an attempt to revitalize Mercosur. 
Argentina’s new Alianza government that gained power in 1999 proposed a new 
emphasis on Mercosur and on more socially oriented policies in its election 
platform (Bernal-Meza and López, 2000: 6), and in December 2000 the goal of 
revitalizing Mercosur was announced in a Presidencial Declaration of the 
Mercosur. In practice, the agreement reached between the presidents called for 
convergence measures including inflation targets and fiscal targets for the public 
sector (ECLAC, 2001: 99) in what we may call a “mini-Maastricht” agreement.  
 
At the same time, positive trends in terms of regional integration happened at the 
South American level. In August 2000, the first South American presidential 
summit was held on the initiative of Brazil. At the summit, the main point of 
discussion was the IIRSA initiative, an initiative that aimed at developing a 
series of energy and infra-structural cooperation projects. The idea was that such 
a practical approach to regional integration would be very useful because it 
could help create a more competitive insertion in the global economy (Lafer, 
2004). What one should note here is that IIRSA was conceived around planned 
development with cooperation between the different South American 
governments and the private sector. It was therefore one of the initial steps in the 
direction of a post-liberal agenda in the region, it could be argued. Pedro Da 
Motta Veiga and Sandra Polônia Rios (2006: 3) thus argue that the liberal 
paradigm was giving way to a doctrine emphasizing managed globalization. As 
we shall see in the analysis of Mercosur’s 2003-2007 phase, this tendency has 
now come to characterize Mercosur, although this has not led to the re-
introduction of the classical “old regionalism” of LAFTA.  
 
In spite of these attempts at a renewed emphasis on regional integration, Brazil’s 
devaluation as well as other factors provoked an economic downturn in 
Argentina and Uruguay, and in response to this development Argentina 
introduced a number of policies that broke with intra-regional trade rules. In 
August 2000, the Argentine government broke the rules in the automotive 
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programme with a rule that required 30% of local components. In the same 
month, Argentina introduced minimum prices for poultry imports from Brazil as 
an anti-dumping measure (ECLAC, 2001: 97-98). The aim was to protect 
national production in Argentina that was caught in a period of economic 
recession.  
 
These policies can be seen as a clear break with “new regionalism” and they 
produced tensions within Mercosur. Demands for protection from domestic 
producers may have influenced the Argentine government to introduce these 
policies, but surely the difficulty of financing the current account deficit was 
also a potent motivator in a situation where Argentina found it very difficult to 
maintain the confidence of international financial market actors that was needed 
to balance the external accounts of the country. In this way the passing from the 
phase of “new regionalism” to a new phase of Mercosur responds to a 
combination of balance of payments related problems and development 
problems just as the passing from “old regionalism” to “new regionalism” 
around 1990 had responded to this combination of problems. 
 
A small improvement occurred in intra-regional trade in 2000, but after this the 
downward tendency continued in response to Argentina’s and Uruguay’s 
economic crises. Argentina’s GDP per capita fell by 5.6% in 2001 and a 
staggering 11.9% in 2002. Uruguay followed Argentina’s trend with a fall of 
4.2% in 2001 and 11.4% in 2002 (ECLAC, 2003: 31). As a consequence intra-
regional exports fell to their lowest point since 1993 reaching just US$ 10.197 
billion in 2002 which corresponded to 11.4% of total exports compared to the 
24.9% in 1997 (ECLAC, 2005: 83). This pattern is typical in Latin America. In 
periods with severe balance of payments problems intra-regional trade tends to 
fall more than extra-regional trade as a consequence of the structural 
characteristics of the economies.  In Brazil’s case intra-regional exports fell to 
just 5.5% of total exports as a response to a staggering reduction in intra-
regional exports of 48% in 2002 (BCB, 2003: 136). Would this development 
mean that Mercosur would be perceived as being irrelevant and perhaps provoke 
the regional integration project’s demise?      
 
The crisis of national development and reduced intra-regional export 
possibilities led to tension and conflicts within Mercosur. From the late 1990’s 
the principles of a common market with a zero tariff internally and common 
external tariffs were broken repeatedly (ECLAC, 2005: 101). This lack of 
compliance with the principles and rules formerly agreed to is looked at in 
different ways. Some analysts see it as highly problematic and as a sign of crisis 
in the regional group (Polônia Rios 2006). Others find that emphasizing how 
these tariff rules were broken misses the point. Bernal-Meza (2002b) argues that 
Argentina’s crisis in 2001 and 2002 made it clear that there was a need to revise 
 15
the nature of Mercosur. According to Bernal-Meza, what was important was to 
leave behind the neo-liberal agenda and turn Mercosur into a group based on 
solidarity between member states and a group with a common external policy 
based on a solid internal cohesion. Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. (2006) argues that 
what we have been experiencing is not the crisis of Mercosur but rather of the 
liberal conception characterizing Mercosur and the development strategies 
pursued before the crisis. Faced with its development crisis, the Argentine 
government introduced a more autonomy seeking policy that was policy-driven 
contrary to the rule-driven approach that had characterized the experiment with 
“open integration” so far. Pressures from society and national development 
considerations came to override the concern for confidence from powerful 
external actors as Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt and challenged the 
interests of foreign companies that had bought up Argentine state companies in 
the 1990s (Mortimore and Stanley, 2006). Similarly, these pressures and 
considerations were behind Argentina’s tendency to break the trade rules of 
Mercosur.  
 
In March 2001 Argentina took unilateral measures as it reduced its external 
tariffs on capital goods and raised tariffs on consumption goods. Brazil first 
complained over this unilateral action by Argentina but after negotiations an 
agreement was reached (ECLAC, 2001: 97). In April Argentina introduced an 
incentives regime in order to promote the national production of capital goods, 
telecommunications and IT, and in May Argentina fixed a minimum price for 
imports of shoes and textiles from all origins (CEPAL, 2002: 23). In July, 
Argentina broke the agreement on the common external tariff reached in March 
by reducing the differentiated tariff from outside Mercosur to 8% with the 
inclusion of the, for Brazil, strategically important sectors of capital goods, 
telecommunications, IT and automobiles. Few days later Brazil suspended all 
trade negotiations with Argentina. In the same month Uruguay decided to 
increase tariffs on all imports including those from Mercosur (ibid: 22-23). 
Clearly, Mercosur at this juncture found itself in a deep crisis. It is important to 
note, however, that this crisis is clearly connected to the development crises 
experienced by Argentina and Uruguay as a consequence of high foreign debt 
exposure and volatile capital flows. 
 
As Marcelo De Paiva Abreu argues (2002), support for mercantilist ideas of 
interventionism was becoming widespread in Argentina and Brazil and the 
interpretation that liberalism had failed was gaining in strength. With regard to 
FTAA negotiations problems mounted in response to the strengthening of 
protectionist views and policies both in Mercosur and in the US. In the United 
States president Bush introduced protectionist policies in the steel sector, a 
sector where Brazil is competitive, and a new Farm Bill in 2002 meant rising 
 16
agricultural subsidies within the United States, a policy that Mercosur members 
are against (Abreu, 2002).  
 
The issue of fairness in distribution at the national and international level and 
the issue of the “correct” role of the state in the economy and in society at large 
came to play an important role in Mercosur as a consequence of the 
development crises experienced. The perceived failure of the liberalization 
paradigm is at the root of this change. 
 
 
Mercosur’s second Moment: Regional Integration from 2003 to 2007 
In order to account for Mercosur’s new direction after Argentina’s deep crisis 
and the ensuing crisis of the regional integration process, it is useful to briefly 
examine the domestic reaction to the crisis context in Argentina. Argentina’s 
development policy underwent a major shift after the crisis broke out. At the end 
of 2001, Argentina announced a default on the state’s foreign debt of more than 
US$ 100 billion. In the case of the privatized public service sector companies, 
prices were ‘pesified’. This meant that the conditions of a large number of 
privatization contracts were broken and that the dollar value of public services 
nosedived (Mortimore and Stanley, 2006). These two policies contradicted the 
emphasis of the neo-liberal period between 1990 and 2001 which was exactly to 
maintain policies that created confidence amongst foreign investors, both 
financial investors and direct investors. The government defended its policy on 
the argument that the crisis conditions legitimized its policies. According to the 
legitimacy argument, the privatized companies had enjoyed overly large profits 
while the production system had entered a deep crisis and while poverty and 
social problems had expanded. Therefore, there was a lack of balance in the 
distribution of gains and losses between the privatized companies and society at 
large (Schoor and Azpiazu, 2003). In other words, the crisis provoked a policy 
of defending society at the expense of foreign economic interests on arguments 
of distributional fairness.  
 
Brazil’s trajectory and policy choices have been different. Brazil did not default 
on its foreign debt nor has it pursued a policy of nationalization or breaches of 
contracts. This has led some analysts to argue that the Lula government can be 
seen as a government of continuity in the area of economic policy (Lafer, 2004). 
This view is debatable and I do not agree with it although it is true that there are 
important elements of continuity in Brazil’s overall economic policy. The Lula 
government has pursued a policy emphasizing the need for primary fiscal 
surpluses as a way to assure creditor confidence and it has not broken 
privatization contracts. In this way, Brazil has not followed Argentina’s 
example. However, important elements of discontinuity are observable in the 
Lula government’s economic policy. There has been a tendency to emphasize 
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strategically oriented state policies directed at particular economic sectors 
(Cervo, 2003)5. The strategic and active state involvement approach is also clear 
in the government’s determined pro-export policy that aims at diversifying 
exports through concrete diplomatic initiatives (Mercadante, 2006). This policy 
has had an important impact on Brazil’s export performance and on the 
stabilization of the economy. During Lula’s first presidency (2003-2006) exports 
have risen from US$ 60.362 billion in 2002 to US$ 137.471 billion in 2006 
(MDIC/SECEX, 2007: 11). This development is impressive although part of the 
export growth can be attributed to higher prices for Brazilian commodity 
exports. However, Brazilian exports are overwhelmingly industrial with 
manufactured and semi-manufactured exports accounting for approximately 
70% of total exports in 2006 (ibid: 17). Another difference in emphasis has been 
the strong emphasis given to South-South cooperation and South American 
integration by the Lula government. South-South cooperation has been 
important in the area of international trade negotiations where the G20 has 
become an important player and has given a more prominent role to developing 
country concerns in the negotiations. The main issue promoted by G20 in 
negotiations is that developed countries should liberalize their agricultural 
sectors giving better market access to producers from developing countries and 
eliminating export subsidies that depress international agricultural commodity 
prices and makes it difficult for developing country producers to compete. This 
position has been defended with a discourse that has stressed the lack of fairness 
in current trade rules and that the existing rules and practices contribute to 
worsening problems of poverty and inequality hurting poor people in the 
developing countries. 
 
All these examples show an attitude of a state that actively defends its interests 
in the international realm while pursuing domestic policies aimed at reducing 
external vulnerability while respecting contracts. It is certainly a quite different 
approach than the more passive integration in the global economy promoted 
during much of the Cardoso period. An important difference between the two 
periods is the view of the role of the state in the economy. Lula’s government 
emphasizes the important role of the state in the strategic planning of Brazil’s 
insertion in the global economy. In this way, the neo-liberal policy of the state’s 
withdrawal from the economy has been left behind without an outright return to 
the situation prior to 1990. 
 
Critics of the Lula government find that the emphasis on Third World 
cooperation has overshadowed the relations with the developed countries and 
has gotten in the way of trade agreements with the United States and the EU 
                                                          
5 Marcelo de Paiva Abreu (2002) who is critical of such policies points out that all presidential candidates in the 
2002 election campaign favored more state interventionism and that there was a strong demand in society, 
including amongst economic elites, for more state interventionism. 
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(Abreu, 2006). This argument of a lack of emphasis on cooperation with the 
developed nations is often defended with the use of trade statistics. These show 
that Brazilian exports to EU and USA have fallen from 50.7% of total Brazilian 
exports in 2002 (BCB, 2003) to around 40.1% in 2006 (MDIC/SECEX, 2007). 
However, exports to the EU and the USA have risen strongly between 2002 and 
2006. What has happened is that exports to other regions have increased even 
more. In this way, the emphasis on export diversification and the valuation of 
export markets in the global South has been successful. 
 
Summing up, a defining element in the change that has taken place in Mercosur 
in this second period of the Mercosur is the importance given to strategic state 
action in defence of national development interests. This has been coupled with 
a policy that has put more emphasis on the diversification of exports, 
particularly to non-traditional markets in the South with emphasis on the large 
emerging markets such as China and India (Regueiro Bello, 2005: 76). More 
autonomous policies based on an alternative vision of the international system 
and of how national interests are best promoted in the international sphere 
characterize the period. The question this raises with regard to regional 
integration efforts in Mercosur and in South America is then what kind of 
impact this change in vision, with its nationalist aspects, has had on integration 
in Mercosur and at the level of South America.   
 
 
Economic Nationalism and the Issue of Cohesion and Crisis in Mercosur 
Argentina’s crisis led, as we have seen, the Argentine government to break 
contracts with foreign investors and to break the trade rules of Mercosur both 
with regard to the common external tariff and the rules for intra-Mercosur trade. 
This tendency continued during Mercosur’s second period with the argument 
that Argentina needed to protect its industrial capacity (Batista Jr., 2006).  
 
According to Pedro da Motta Veiga (2005), trade negotiations have become part 
of the domestic agenda in Mercosur and there have been a number of tensions 
between Argentina and Brazil with regard to intra-Mercosur trade policy. The 
key issue has been Argentina’s petition to establish new safeguard mechanisms 
within the functioning of the block. The aim with this policy is to reduce 
asymmetries between Argentina and Brazil and to avoid an “invasion” of 
Brazilian products. Initially Brazil was unwilling to accept the idea that was 
very unpopular in the Brazilian business sector (Regueira Bello, 2005: 84), but 
after bilateral trade became increasingly unbalanced with growing Brazilian 
surpluses during the period from 2004 to 2006 Brazil accepted such safeguard 
mechanisms in 2006 to the irritation of the political opposition in Brazil. Along 
with this a diplomatic crisis between Argentina and Uruguay over the 
construction of paper companies in Uruguay close to its border with Argentina 
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has developed, and Uruguay and Paraguay have openly complained about the 
lack of emphasis on asymmetries inside Mercosur. This has led some 
commentators to speak of a crisis of identity of the Mercosur project (Costa, 
2006: 30-33). A critic (Abreu, 2006) argues that the up-beat rhetoric of the 
Brazilian government regarding Mercosur and South American cooperation does 
not correspond to reality and José Guilhon de Albuquerque criticizes Brazil’s 
willingness to accommodate Argentina, since such a flexible posture involves 
costs for Brazilian business (Campos and Filho, 2005).  
 
Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. (2006) disagrees. He argues that Mercosur is not 
experiencing a real crisis. It is reasonable when Argentina argues for the need 
for flexibility in order to protect its industrial capacity and deal with 
asymmetries. Aldo Ferrer (2006) argues along these same lines that Brazil’s 
flexible attitude is correct, since Argentina needs to re-industrialize after a 
period of de-industrialization provoked by erroneous policies that did not give 
sufficient emphasis to the promotion of Argentine industrial development.  
 
Recently, the Brazilian government accommodated Argentina’s claim for the 
institutionalization of safeguard mechanisms in intra-Mercosur trade 
(Mercadante, 2006). Similarly, Mercosur introduced a structural fund aimed at 
supporting the small economies in Mercosur that same year (ibid). In this way, 
Mercosur seems to be moving in a direction of attacking asymmetries between 
member countries in order to assure more balanced outcomes. This is a 
deliberate policy on the part of the Brazilian government and reflects its 
emphasis on regional integration in South America (Guimarães, 2006). 
 
There are different reasons why Brazil places such a large emphasis on regional 
integration in South America. One is certainly that the Lula government sees 
Brazil as a regional leader in South America and believes that a cohesive South 
American block will strengthen Brazil’s international political prominence 
(Lima and Hirst, 2006). Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães who is considered one of 
the main ideological forces in the Lula government has exactly argued this point 
suggesting that Mercosur should gain a more prominent role in the 
reorganization of the international economic and political order (2006: 128-129). 
This position is vastly different from Escudé’s position of “peripheral realism” 
in the early 1990s that called for a passive adaptation to the designs promoted by 
the United States. The present Brazilian government is actively seeking to 
influence and change aspects of the international order and has gained prestige 
on the international scene from its initiatives (Seitenfuss, 2007), although some 
observers believe that Brazil’s attempt at influencing the world order is 
unrealistic and has not produced any results.  
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Another important reason for Brazil’s interest in maintaining a cohesive block at 
the level of Mercosur and at expanding South American cooperation is 
economic. South America takes a prominent role in Brazil’s export profile. In 
spite of Mercosur’s crisis in the early part of the present decade, intra-Mercosur 
trade has more than doubled between 2002 and 2005 and its relative importance 
in total exports is rising again (CEPAL, 2006: 81). Brazilian exports to LAIA 
members, including Mercosur, corresponded to 22.8 % of total exports in 2006, 
with 10.1% going to Mercosur members and the last 12.7% going to other LAIA 
members. This makes LAIA Brazil’s largest export market surpassing both the 
EU, which has traditionally been Brazil’s largest export market, and the United 
States (MDIC/SECEX, 2007: 20-21), and exports directed at LAIA are 
overwhelmingly industrial at around 90 % of the total (BCB, 2005: 121). 
Venezuela, which became the fifth Mercosur member in 2006, turned into 
Brazil’s tenth largest export market in 2006 where Venezuela was Brazil’s 
fastest growing export market amongst Brazil’s 12 largest export markets 
(MDIC/SECEX, 2007: 21). At the same time, Brazilian businesses are investing 
heavily in the region. There are thus strong commercial and economic motives 
behind Brazil’s interest in regional integration apart from such motives as the 
desire for a leadership role at the regional and global level. Some analysts argue 
that Brazil also aims at challenging US leadership in the region. I will turn to 
these debates in the following. 
 
 
International Aspects of Current Regional Integration in South America  
In this section I analyze international political, economic and ideological aspects 
of Mercosur’s integration trajectory in recent years. I emphasize three 
interconnected issues. First, I focus on the construction of a common vision for 
the insertion of Argentina and Mercosur in the international system. Then, I 
analyze the relationship between Mercosur and the United States with an 
emphasis on the FTAA negotiations and US-Brazilian relations. Finally, I 
analyze Mercosur’s expansion and cooperation in South America.  
 
 
A Common Vision: the “Buenos Aires Consensus” 
In October 2003, Brazil’s new president Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva and 
Argentina’s new president Néstor Kirchner met in the capital of Argentina, 
Buenos Aires. One of the outcomes of the meeting was the formulation of a 
common vision of the two governments. This vision was given the name of the 
“Buenos Aires Consensus” and it can be seen as a response to the “Washington 
Consensus”. 
 
The Buenos Aires Consensus was formulated in a context where Argentina was 
struggling to emerge from its crisis and the new government of Brazil was 
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seeking to gain confidence from international financial markets in order to avoid 
a default on its foreign debt. It was formulated shortly after the Cancún meeting 
of the WTO. At the Cancún meeting an obstacle to agreement on international 
trade issues had been disagreement between the newly formed G20 coalition of 
developing countries and the leading industrial countries. All the member states 
in Mercosur are amongst the members of G20 as are regional leaders in the 
developing world India, China and South Africa. The G20’s aim is to reform 
agricultural trade rules with a view of opening the markets of the developed 
countries for imports from the South and of convincing the developed countries 
to give up export subsidies in the agricultural sector and cut down on domestic 
subsidies to agriculture. This same issue was also on the agenda in the FTAA 
negotiations with the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere in 
November, i.e. a month after the formulation of the Buenos Aires Consensus. 
Thus, October 2003 can be seen as a moment central to the definition of the 
insertion of Mercosur in the global economy. 
 
In this context, the two presidents signed the Buenos Aires Consensus6 in which 
they called for a more balanced globalization that would be more conducive to 
development in developing countries. The presidents promised to honour the 
foreign obligations of their countries on the condition that this could be coupled 
with sustainable economic growth characterized by job creation and room for 
social policies that would allow a more socially balanced development.  
 
The Buenos Aires Consensus can therefore be seen as a progressive agenda that 
calls for a more equilibrated world order that reduces asymmetries at the global 
level. It can thus be seen as a political intervention in the diplomatic agenda 
between Mercosur and the leading industrial countries. The common vision of 
Argentina and Brazil thus represents an attempt to create a more legitimate 
world order seen from their perspectives. As we have seen, the issue of 
asymmetries has also received attention within Mercosur recently, and 
particularly Brazil is taking leadership within the group in an attempt to reduce 
asymmetries inside Mercosur. The fight against social exclusion and asymmetric 
development at the national level is also emphasized in the domestic policies of 
individual Mercosur member countries. In other words, Mercosur’s agenda is 
characterized by this emphasis on dealing politically with reducing development 
asymmetries and poverty. During the neo-liberal period, it was also hoped that 
liberal policies would promote economic growth and reduce poverty, but free 
market rules were the core component believed to produce such outcomes 
whereas state involvement has a more central role in the present approach. 
 
                                                          
6 Consenso de Buenos Aires. From Instituto del Tercer Mundo. Downloaded on October 20th from 
http://www.item.org.uy/Documentos/consenso_portugues.htm.   
 22
It is significant for Mercosur’s trajectory from 2003 that Argentina and Brazil 
had come to some degree of a shared vision on these points given the centrality 
of bilateral relations between these two countries in the regional integration of 
Mercosur and of South America (Cervo, 2003; Guimarães, 2006). On the basis 
of this shared vision Mercosur developed an assertive position in its negotiations 
with the developed centre countries and an active policy aimed at expanding 
South American integration while taking into consideration existing 
asymmetries. These issues are taken up in the following sections. 
 
 
The FTAA and Relations between Mercosur and the United States 
During the presidential campaign, Lula described the FTAA as not being a 
project of integration but a project of annexation of Latin America by the United 
States (Bandeira, 2005: 4). Briefly after the election of Lula, Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães, who is a leading figure in the foreign policy making elite in the Lula 
government and who is seen as a leading ideologue behind the diplomatic vision 
of the government, argued that it would not be dangerous for Brazil to stand 
outside the FTAA if such an agreement was reached. He further argued that 
FTAA, as it was envisioned at the time, would prevent Brazil from pursuing 
active policies in a number of areas such as in the area of industrial policy, 
technological policy and foreign investment policy. This was unacceptable for 
Brazil, because Brazil needed to be able to pursue active and strategic policies in 
these areas if it was to successfully face its three main development challenges 
which were to reduce social and regional disparities, eliminate the chronic 
external vulnerabilities and achieve Brazil’s true potential (Guimarães, 2002).  
 
A few days after the government took over power, Guimarães elaborated on 
how Brazil should face its main challenges. Brazil should work towards creating 
a multipolar world order and Mercosur was a key instrument in achieving this. 
Brazil should also avoid making agreements that would reduce its ability to 
pursue autonomous policies (Guimarães, 2003). It would be a mistake to agree 
to the type of rules that the US wanted and it could lead to a deepening of the 
economic and social crisis in Brazil and provoke de-industrialization and 
thereby further accentuate asymmetries between the United States and Brazil 
and increase external vulnerabilities (Guimarães, 2006). 
 
It is clear that the position taken by the Brazilian government therefore stood in 
the way of the creation of an FTAA along the lines proposed by the United 
States that apart from assuring better market access for industrial products and 
services also wanted to introduce WTO-plus provisions, the so-called new issues 
or Singapore issues in the area of foreign investment, intellectual property, 
public procurement, services and competition (Abreu, 2005: 10). The US 
interest in juridical security to investors was a delicate issue because it could get 
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in the way of autonomous industrial policies (Oliveira, 2003: 317) and create the 
kind of protection, security and freedom to investors that would allow investors 
to sue governments if they believed that national policies somehow jeopardized 
their profits, not only in the case of outright expropriation and nationalization 
but also in cases where rules and regulations were changed to their detriment. 
One example of such changes in rules and regulations was exactly Argentina’s 
pesification policy mentioned earlier. 
 
Brazil’s position towards the FTAA, led some analysts to argue that the Lula 
government was anti-American. Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães disagreed with this 
and argued that Brazil wanted to increase cooperation with the United States as 
long as the cooperation was based on the common ideas of democracy, fairness 
and sovereignty (Guimarães, 2003). The implication of this view is that the 
WTO-plus provisions should be avoided both in WTO and FTAA negotiations, 
and for that matter also in the negotiations between Mercosur and the EU, in 
order to assure fairness and the maintenance of the ability and right to pursue 
autonomous development policies on the part of Mercosur countries.  
 
On the basis of these views, Brazil and Argentina did not present offers in the 
areas of public procurement, services and investments, and intellectual property 
rules in FTAA negotiations (Oliveira, 2003: 320), while the United States gave 
differentiated offers to different groups of countries without offers in 
agricultural subsidies and anti-dumping policies (Bouzas, 2005: 15) where 
Mercosur were demandeurs. As a consequence an ‘FTAA Lite’ was adopted 
establishing different levels of agreement between different countries (ibid) and 
today the FTAA is largely considered to be dead after it was rejected by 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The United States has instead embarked on 
bilateral trade negotiations with Latin American countries and it goes on 
defending the type of policies it has promoted in NAFTA and in FTAA 
negotiations earlier on. Agreements have been reached with Chile, Peru, 
Colombia and Central America along these lines (Batista Jr., 2006).  
 
The potential for strengthening a South American block that is one of Brazil’s 
main foreign policy goals (Lima and Hirst, 2006; Guimarães, 2006: 263) in its 
quest for a more balanced multipolar world order from a position of autonomy 
in relation to the United States (Cervo, 2003) therefore seems to have become 
greater in this second moment of Mercosur although a number of challenges 
such as the bilateral trade deals between the US and different Latin American 
governments persist. I turn to this issue in the last section below. 
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Mercosur’s Expansion and South American Integration 
In an article on the Lula government’s diplomatic concepts and strategies Celso 
Amorim, Brazil’s foreign minister, argues that Brazil’s priority is South 
American relations. He describes integration as an imperative and argues that 
the destiny of Brazil and its South American neighbourhood rests on their 
mutual dependence (Amorim, 2004). Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães stresses this 
same point (2006) and argues that a stable, democratic and prosperous South 
American region is in Brazil’s interest. Improved economic and social 
development would not only help stabilize the countries politically but it would 
also improve business and export opportunities. Countries such as Peru, Ecuador 
and Bolivia had almost developed into “failed states” (Almeida, 2006) after the 
liberal experiments of the 1990s and Venezuela has recently gone through a 
period of political polarization and economic instability as it has opted for a 
nationalist and anti-American leadership. 
 
In one way this context makes South American regional integration a 
challenging endeavour due to nationalist policies and different national 
strategies. On the other hand, however, the broadly shared criticism of market-
led development with a passive state and a shared scepticism in many South 
American countries of US-led initiatives such as the FTAA creates a fertile 
ground for regional integration.  
 
In the following I first analyze the issue of Mercosur’s internal cohesion in the 
second moment of Mercosur’s historical trajectory and then I go on to analyzing 
the expansion of Mercosur and other initiatives that point towards an 
enhancement of South American integration. 
 
With the crisis in intra-regional trade and faced with an agenda dominated by 
Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay felt that Mercosur was not 
responding sufficiently to their needs and interests. Uruguay was dissatisfied 
with its market access to the other members and with the lack of participation in 
productive industrial networks (Pereira, 2006: 40-41). Paraguay had similar 
criticisms and both countries wanted to be able to make bilateral agreements 
with the United States (Costa, 2006: 30-33). In short, the perception in the small 
member countries was that Mercosur was too asymmetrical and did not assure a 
fair distribution of gains. The danger was therefore that they would want to 
leave the regional integration scheme. Uruguay’s announcement that they were 
considering a free-trade agreement with the United States (Pereira, 2006: 41) 
created speculation that the US might be able to contribute to splitting up the 
group. According to Brazil’s foreign minister Celso Amorim, the dissatisfaction 
of the two small member countries was reasonable. He proposed that a New 
Deal should be developed to reach a new understanding with Paraguay and 
Uruguay. Such a New Deal should include financing mechanisms and 
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investment projects amongst other things (Costa, 2006: 33). An initial step taken 
in this direction was the introduction of structural funds in 2006 with the aim of 
reducing asymmetries in the block. This new institutional development is known 
as FOCEM. The funds are to particularly benefit the small members and to be 
mainly financed by Brazil (ibid; Pereira, 2006: 41). Lula has visited Uruguay in 
February 2007, briefly before the visit of US president George Bush in Uruguay, 
and he has visited Paraguay in May 2007. During his visits, Lula offered 
Uruguay a “package” consisting of investments, financing mechanisms and 
facilitation of Uruguayan exports to the Brazilian market7 and he offered a 
similar “package” to Paraguay with a particular emphasis on cooperation in the 
bio-energy sector.8  The fear that Uruguay might leave Mercosur, coupled with 
the favourable inclination of the Lula government to manage globalization and 
regional integration actively with a view of enhancing strategic goals and 
reducing structural asymmetries seem to have been the two key motivational 
factors behind this initiative. On top of these initiatives, Brazil has introduced an 
innovative policy aimed at increasing imports from its South American 
neighbours in general in order to reduce its huge export surplus in the region and 
promote development. 
 
Mercosur has been enlarged with the entrance of Venezuela as a full member in 
2006 and Bolivia has shown interest in joining the block and negotiations are 
underway. These two countries have pursued strongly nationalist policies with 
nationalization and increased taxation in the energy sector which dominates the 
export profile in both countries. In the case of Bolivia the nationalization policy 
affected Brazilian interests as Petrobras has a strong presence in Bolivia. Views 
are split on the merit or lack thereof of the inclusion of Venezuela and Bolivia in 
Mercosur. Critics find that Venezuela in principle could strengthen Mercosur 
but that it is likely that Venezuela’s president’s strong rhetoric against the 
United States and neo-liberalism could lead to conflicts in the block and in the 
block’s extra-regional relations. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu (2006) believes that 
the pro-Venezuelan policy of the government is a mistake, while Batista Jr. 
(2006: 5-6) finds that Venezuela’s entry in Mercosur shows that Mercosur is not 
in a deep crisis. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira (2006) goes even farther arguing 
that the entry of Venezuela strengthens and consolidates the economic and 
political unity of South America and that Venezuela’s huge energy reserves are 
of strategic importance to the region. In mid-2007, however, a diplomatic crisis 
developed between Venezuela and Brazil as Venezuela’s president Chávez 
criticized the Brazilian congress for representing the interests of Brazilian 
business elites and for being too closely allied with the United States. From the 
                                                          
7 Folha de São Paulo, 24/02/2007, ”Contra EUA, Lula oferece ”pacote” ao Uruguay”. Downloaded on February 
26, 2007 at http://tools.folha.com.br/print?site=emcimadahora&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww1.fol...  
8 Folha de São Paulo, 20/05/2007. Denize Bacoccina, “Quatro anos depois, Lula visita Paraguay com pacote de 
ajuda”. 
 26
perspective of the Venezuelan president, this had the negative effect on the 
Mercosur that its rules and approach to regional integration continued to be 
overly neo-liberal favouring big business rather than a more people-oriented 
approach to regional integration9. In this way, Venezuela remains difficult to 
integrate in Mercosur as Chávez wishes to have a large imprint on the nature of 
Mercosur and finds it hard to accept difficulties in the ability to shape Mercosur. 
 
The Brazilian government is taking a pragmatic attitude in its relations with its 
neighbours in order to promote this widened integration at the South American 
level. This is particularly evident in the case of Bolivia. In spite of the 
nationalization of energy sources that affected Petrobrás negatively, the 
Brazilian government has been quite accommodating towards Bolivia. For 
instance Amorim has argued that it was Bolivia’s right to nationalize (Silva, 
2006: 16) and Lula has argued that it was obvious that Bolivia was going to 
nationalize at some point because the population had voted overwhelmingly for 
this option making it a legitimate policy. For Brazil the question was to that a 
reasonable agreement was reached between Bolivia and Petrobrás10, and in this 
regard the main issue was to assure stable access to Bolivian gas. 
 
 
Mercosur-Andes Community Relations and Unasul 
Apart from the strengthening of Mercosur through a recent tendency towards 
more cohesiveness in the group and the enlargement of Mercosur with 
Venezuela, Mercosur has also moved closer to the rest of the Andes countries. 
In 2003 Mercosur and the Andes Community reached a trade agreement. This 
development helped create the conditions for the foundation of the South 
American Community of Nations, or CASA, in December 2004. The Mercosur 
countries, the Andes Group countries, Chile, Guiana and Suriname partake in 
this new block that aims at increasing cooperation in a number of areas such as 
the integration of the region’s transport and energy infrastructure (Mercadante, 
2006: 38-39). Recently, at the first South American energy summit on Isla 
Margarita (Venezuela) in April 2007, CASA was renamed Unasul and it was 
agreed that Unasul cooperation should be institutionalized with a secretariat in 
Ecuador. The energy summit was yet another initiative towards greater South 
American integration. More cooperation in the energy and transport sectors can 
be seen as a way to seek to increase South America’s systemic competitiveness. 
It fits the new regional integration conception that has left an almost exclusive 
emphasis on commercial issues and now focuses more on strategic long-term 
planning and physical integration. The rules-oriented approach from the 1990s 
                                                          
9 “Mercosur: Hugo Chávez choca con Brasil y amenaza con abandonarlo”. Infolatam, June 2’nd 2007. 
http://www.infolatam.com/entrada.jsp?id=4369 
 
10 O Globo, October 10’th 2006, ”Lula ataca Alckmin e diz que PSDB é empresa de vender estatais”. 
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has been supplanted by a policy-oriented approach that emphasizes systemic 
improvements in productivity at a South American scale and a solidarity 
oriented approach to tackling asymmetries. The systemic view of national 
competitiveness thus seems to have taken over from the view emphasizing 
liberal markets. A systemic view implies that national economies, or regional 
economies, should be thought of in systemic terms and development strategies 
should emphasize how national economies can become competitive. Along these 
lines, Lima and Coutinho (2006) have argued that what we are seeing is a return 
to the national developmental approach but now on a regional South American 
scale. It remains to be seen if this recent development will be successful, but it 
seems clear that the dominant policy-driven conception of South American 
regional integration with its aim on solidarity, reduction of asymmetries and 
emphasis on physical infrastructure integration aims at a flying geese model of 
regional integration. 
 
The developments discussed above can be seen as positive steps towards more 
cooperation in South America.  
 
However, there is still some way towards assuring a cohesive block that could 
pursue a common external policy. The bilateral free trade agreements between 
the United States and different South American countries are not compatible 
with the integration of countries like Peru, Colombia and Chile in Mercosur or a 
South American customs union (Batista Jr., 2006: 8), since Mercosur does not 
allow countries individual free trade agreements with extra-regional partners. 
Thus, it seems that the United States has been successful in promoting policies 
that make it difficult to promote a cohesive and unified South American block. 
In other words, the United States seems to have given up on the FTAA project 
of hemispheric integration and embarked on a plan B that focuses on tying Latin 
American countries to the United States through bilateral agreements along the 
lines of NAFTA and in this way obstruct the construction of a solid unified 
South American block. At the same time, the United States seeks cooperation 
and more modest trade agreements, in terms of their range, individually with 
Mercosur countries.   
 
Although it thus does not seem likely that a unified and cohesive South 
American block is about to emerge, South American integration seems to be 
moving forward fast with an expanded Mercosur that is becoming more 
cohesive. Furthermore, Mercosur has been successful in fostering closer 
cooperation with other South American countries with regard to trade and 
investment relations as well as infrastructure integration and energy cooperation. 
This can be seen as a step in the direction of an enhanced level of cooperation at 
the level of South America and thus a step in the right direction from the 
perspective of South American integration and development.  
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Conclusion 
Latin American countries have historically been characterized by an 
international insertion characterized by heavy economic links to Europe and 
United States and a limited level of intra-regional trade, largely on account of an 
economic specialization in the area of primary products. This characteristic, also 
known as the “Colonial Syndrome” has made it either uninteresting or difficult 
to integrate “horizontally” with neighbouring countries because of 
uncomplimentary economic structures and strategies aimed at national 
development behind protectionist barriers. 
 
Mercosur represents the most successful attempt at modifying this heritage. 
Mercosur emerged as an expansion of the initial initiative of Argentina and 
Brazil to integrate their economies through strategic sector agreements in the 
1980s. With the expansion Paraguay and Uruguay were added at the same time 
that the integration scheme moved towards a more liberal insertion in the 
international economy through a strategy of “open regionalism” characterized 
by rapid liberalization of intra-regional trade along with liberalization towards 
the rest of the world. The goal was to tackle the financial and development 
crises affecting member countries in the early part of the 1990s through a 
strategy that depended heavily on foreign investments and the confidence of 
foreign creditors. The integration project focused on commercial issues and was 
conceived in a rules-oriented way with a strong inspiration from liberal thinking. 
The strategy was successful in terms of increasing intra-regional trade both in 
absolute and relative terms, thus reducing the traditional “Colonial Syndrome”. 
However, the way stabilization strategies were conceived created increasing 
problems due to external imbalances and a growing dependency on foreign 
capital inflows. As a consequence of this development all member countries 
came to face international financial volatility in the late 1990s and first years of 
the present decade. This provoked stagnation and a major development crisis in 
Argentina and Uruguay in 2001 and 2002. At the same time, these development 
problems led to tensions within the regional grouping and to a large number of 
policies that broke Mercosur’s internal trade rules. Argentina was the main 
offender. The motivation for breaking Mercosur rules as well as for defaulting 
on Argentina’s foreign debt and for changing privatization contracts with the 
companies that had taken over state companies in the service sector was to 
protect society from the economic crisis and find new ways to reignite economic 
growth and job creation. This meant that the neo-liberal ideas that characterized 
the 1990s came under attack and that Mercosur changed its nature and became 
more policy-driven and more focused on the need to fight economic 
asymmetries and to emphasize solidarity at the regional level. This implied costs 
for Brazil, as the most advanced economy in the region, and there was some 
resistance to this development from the business sector and the political 
opposition. 
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The experience of national development crises created tensions inside the block 
and more generally between South American countries, but at the same time it 
led most South American countries to distance themselves from the FTAA as 
proposed by the United States due to its neo-liberal conception and due to the 
growing scepticism towards US policies towards the region. This helped 
strengthen regional cooperation and integration now guided by a conception that 
was more policy-driven and emphasized physical integration and state 
involvement. Mercosur and the Andes Group reached a trade agreement that 
opened up for the Community of South American Nations (CASA) that recently 
changed its name to Unasul, and Venezuela joined Mercosur in response to 
other Andes Group members’ celebration of preferential trade agreements with 
the United States inspired by NAFTA and neo-liberal ideas. At the same time 
Bolivia has shown interests in entering Mercosur.  
 
South American integration is thus developing in two speeds. Mercosur 
represents the core and its integration is developing the fastest, now with an 
integration conception focusing on strategic state action and coordination 
between the states. The commercial emphasis has been downplayed. Instead 
physical integration and a systemic conception of the economic competitiveness 
of the region is emphasized along with ideas of solidarity and the reduction of 
asymmetries. Intra-regional trade is growing again and Mercosur countries are 
engaged in strategies that aim at a geographically more diversified export 
structure. In practice exports to other Southern markets is the way in which 
Mercosur countries seek to assure export diversification. This is yet another step 
towards leaving behind the old “Colonial Syndrome” by reducing the relative 
weight of the traditional export markets, Europe and United States. This step 
aims at reducing the dependency on these countries and thus at increasing 
national autonomy. Regional integration is an element in assuring this autonomy 
and a stronger voice in international economic negotiations. Outside the 
Mercosur core, cooperation with countries such as Chile, Colombia and Peru, 
that have free trade agreements with the United States, has increased with the 
construction of CASA/Unasul and the recent celebration of the first South 
American energy summit. With the emphasis on energy cooperation and 
infrastructural integration as well as on trade cooperation between Mercosur and 
its South American neighbours thus follows the general trend of Mercosur. 
Mercosur is that at the heart of a tendency towards ever closer integration in 
South America that may lead to an important break with the “Colonial 
Syndrome”, although asymmetries in the region means that some countries have 
a long way to go in terms of industrializing their economic structures. However, 
the tendency towards more autonomous national policies along with a 
conception of integration that emphasizes the desirability of reducing economic 
asymmetries and strengthening the South American region’s economy in 
systemic terms may prove to help the less developed countries in the direction of 
 30
more diversified economic structures and industrialization. If this happens, 
would be stepping down the path of East Asia’s development experience with its 
flying geese model of development. Japan’s role in the East Asian development 
trajectory would be left primarily to Brazil, and secondarily to Argentina and 
oil-rich Venezuela. However, it remains to be seen if Mercosur will be able to 
integrate Venezuela with its highly ideological and un-diplomatic leader.  
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